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UNDER THE DANUBE CANOPY:

THE FUTURE OF INTER-

NATIONAL WATERWAY LAW
MICHAEL A. HYMAN^
INTRODUCTION

Regulating the use of international waterways is a source of
substantial conflict among a great many nations. The process of creating a
uniform set of laws to govern international waterways is stymied by
contradictory ideologies of autonomous states. Why is it so important to
regulate these waterways? The first and foremost reason is that a river is a
"hydrologic unit."' This means that water use upstream has a direct effect
downstream, and vice versa.2 To illustrate this point, consider the effect of
substantial irrigation and hydroelectric projects by upstream inhabitants
(upper riparians). These projects will reduce the flow to those people
living and working downstream (lower riparians) 3 Conversely, if lower
riparians were to construct a dam to regulate water flow, the rate of water
flow upriver would be affected.
To describe this circumstance in economic terms, international
water resources are considered to be "common-pool" resources.5 Purely
public goods are goods that are nonexcludable 6 and nonrival.7 On the
other end of the spectrum are private goods, which are fully excludable
and rival.' In between purely public and purely private goods, two other
types of goods exist: impure public goods, which are nonexcludable yet
"Mr. Hyman received his B.A. in English from Rutgers University in 1996, and his J.D.
from the College of William and Mary School of Law in 1999.
'See Jonathan E. Cohen, InternationalLaw and the Water Politics of the Euphrates, 24
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 502, 505 (1991).
2
See id.
' See id. at 505-06.
4 See

id. at 506.

See Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The
Challenges of InternationalWater Resources Law, 90 AM. J.INT'L L. 384, 388 (1996).
6 See id. "They are nonexcludable because it is impossible or prohibitively costly to
prevent outsiders from gaining access to them." Id.
' See id. "They are nonrival because a user's consumption of a unit of that good does not
detract from its benefits to others. Thus, the neighbor who cleans the sidewalk provides a
public good that each pedestrian enjoys without diminishing the enjoyment of others." Id.
8 See id. "The user may prevent others from using it and the consumption of any part
detracts from the whole." Id.
5
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rival; and common-pool resources, which are partially excludable and
rival.9 This note is concerned only with the latter. International rivers and
waterways fit within the common-pool resource classification: the benefits
of common-pool resources "are partially excludable ....
[N]onriparians
have no access to the water resources and cannot benefit from them
directly. Their benefits are also rival, since any unit of water diverted or
polluted by one riparian reduces the amount available to the other riparians
or its quality."'"
In other words, upper riparians may exclude lower riparians from
the waterway, and upper riparians also may use the waterway in a manner
that is harmful to downstream uses or users."
Thus, international
waterways are susceptible to the "tragedy of the commons"' 2 problem, in
which each of the users receives direct benefits from its unilateral act,
13
while the costs are spread to all.
The danger that waterway use by one state will have a detrimental
effect upon another state is heightened as one considers that as the world
population grows, the supply of international river water will be
diminished. 4 Increased use of freshwater leaves those downstream with
less water to use." In addition, massive industrial growth, especially in
developing countries, will lead to an increased danger of pollution.' 6
Taken together, these factors demonstrate the importance, and indeed, the
necessity, of meaningful regulation of international waterways. ,7
This note describes the effects of growing problems, such as
'See id.
to Id.
"See id.
12 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sdl. 1243, 1244 (1968).
The
"tragedy of the commons" is the economic principle that demonstrates that self-interests
overpower community interests in regards to a common area owned by all. See id.
13 See Benvenisti, supra note 5, at 388.
14 See Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary
Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over GabcikovoNagymaros, 19 SUFFOLKTRANSNAT'L L. REv. 67, 68-70 (1995).
'" See Patricia K. Wouters, An Assessment of Recent Developments in International
Watercourse Law through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation,
36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 417, 417-18 (1996).
16 See David J. Lazerwitz, The Flow of International Water Law: The InternationalLaw
Commission'sLaw of the Non-NavigationalUses of InternationalWatercourses, I IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1993); Niveen Tadros, Comment, Shrinking Water
Resources: The National Security Issue of this Century, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 1091,
1091 (1997); Eckstein, supra note 14, at 68-69.
"7 See Lazerwitz, supra note 16, at 248; Tadros, supra note 16, at 1092.
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population growth, upon the use of shared waterways; describes the
problems of enforcement and implementation of environmental
international law; analyzes the impacts of the International Court of
Justice's recent decision concerning the on-going dispute between
Hungary and Slovakia over the common use of the Danube River; and
argues that the strict sovereignty-based ideologies of nations, if
perpetuated, will prevent efficient resolutions of international disputes
regarding waterway usage.
Part I follows the evolution of customary international watercourse
law and describes some of the competing ideologies regarding these
Part I begins with a brief history of international
watercourses.
watercourse law beginning with Roman Law. Then, the modem
approaches to this subject, namely the sovereignty and integrity theories,
are examined and scrutinized. This section then delves into the present
leading theory, a theory labeled sic utere, 8 and examines the sources that
secure sic utere's role in international law.
Part II describes the four prominent methods available to solve
international watercourse disputes and identifies the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach. The four methods to be discussed are: (1)
general/customary international law; (2) multilateral treaties and
negotiation; (3) international institutions; and (4) third party settlement.
The three principal systems of third party settlement that will be
scrutinized are mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.
Part III reviews a recent dispute involving international waterway
law, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project dispute between Slovakia and
Hungary. This discussion illustrates how well some of the dispute
resolution methods addressed in Part II actually work, and what direction
international watercourse law is heading in the future.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY LAW
A. Origins of CustomaryInternational Waterway Law
Roman law showed little interest in the direct management of
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is a common law principle that "one should use his
own property in such a manner as not to injure others." Lazerwitz, supra note 16, at 251
n.16 (quoting Chapman v. Bennett, 169 N.E. 2d 212, 214 (1960). It generally stands for
the proposition that a nation must not use resources within its territory in a fashion that
adversely affects the rights of other nations. See Eckstein, supra note 14, at 75.
ISSic
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water resources. 9 The role of the state was basically limited to protecting
navigation:
Any riparian owner, or anybody who could prove
long-standing open use, could use the water of a stream as
long as that use did not infringe upon the right of others or
impair navigation. The role of the state was limited to
protecting navigation, and any use that conflicted with
navigation was forbidden. 0
"Roman law designated the air, the oceans, the seashore, running water
and ocean fish as res communes, or as incapable of private ownership but
as open to the free use of all.,, 2' Thus, under Roman law, the lack of direct
regulation of waterway uses left a substantial amount of power to custom
in the determination of water use distribution among riparian
landowners.22
English common law did not follow the res communes approach of
Roman law.' The King assumed dominion and control of waterways. 4
However, the jus publicum, or public's right of use, could not be
restricted, even by the King.2 English law advocated an approach that
would allow a riparian owner to use the water for "ordinary purposes,"
such as for the needs of his livestock. 6 This approach was without
limitation; the upper riparian owner could consume the water supply
entirely.2 7 In addition, the common law permitted water use for
"extraordinary purposes" if the use was reasonable and the user restored
the water to a level "substantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in
'
character."28
'9 See

Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International
Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 60 (1991).
20 id.
21 MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

IN AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920 17 (1987).
12

See Teclaff, supranote 19, at 63.

23 See SELVIN, supra note 21, at 25.
24 See id. The King had the power to order the removal of all nuisances, charter

passenger ferries, and authorize construction of port facilities. See id. at 25-26.
25 See id. at 26.
26 See Teclaff, supra note 19, at 64 (citing a 1926 English Court of Chancery decision,
Attwood v. Llay Main Collieries, Ltd., Ch. 444, 458 (1926)).
27
28

See id.
Id.
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The English common law doctrine promoted flexibility, but
fostered unpredictability and uncertainty, as well.29 In response, states
west of the Mississippi River began to get more involved and issue
permits to users.30 States east of the Mississippi eventually began to
follow suit.3" Thus, the common law failed to eliminate the need for
administrative authorization and a system of administrative allocation of
water replaced the common law.32
American common law pertaining to the usage of waterways by the
public developed from the English common law. 33 By the 1820's,
differences between the American and English common law began to
emerge.34 One example of American deviation from English common law
concerns the denial of private property ownership of rivers.35 Although
English law recognized that the public had a right of passage, it also
36 American
allowed private ownership of river banks and river beds.
courts, perhaps due to economic considerations and geographic differences
between the U.S. and England, deviated from English common law and
ruled that rivers could not be privately owned.3 7 However, despite this
example and similar deviations from English common law, a large portion
of American common law and modem customary practices grew from the
3
attitudes and ideologies underlying English common law."
While this section has dealt with national law, it should be noted
that international law has followed a similar development in relation to
international waterways.39

29

See id.

id. at 64-65.
3'See id.
30 See

19, at 65.
21, at 26-27.
note
334 See SELVIN, supra
See id. at 31.

3See Teclaff, supra note

" See id. at 32-36.

See id. at 33. "The riparian proprietor ... held the exclusive right of fishery to the
center of the stream, and was entitled to compensation for damages to the enjoyment of
his property caused by construction designed to improve navigation." Id.
31 See id. at 32-36.
36

31 See

id. at 38.

" See Albert E. Utton, International Water Quality Law, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 154, 158 (Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974).
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B. Modern Waterway Law: Balancing the Tension Between Absolute
Sovereignty andAbsolute TerritorialIntegrity
Modem international waterway law stems from the consideration
of two divergent theories of waterway usage, absolute territorial
sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity.4"
Absolute territorial sovereignty theory, often asserted by upper
riparian states, insists that the state is the "master of its own territory," and
may use the watercourse as necessary without regard for any other riparian
state.4 '
This theory is often referred to as the Harmon Doctrine.42 The
Harmon Doctrine emanates from a U.S.-Mexico dispute over the Rio
Grande.43 The controversy arose in the late nineteenth century, when
Mexico alerted the United States that several Mexican communities were
on the brink of annihilation because of the United States' practice of
seizing water from the Rio Grande.'
U.S. Attorney General Judson
Harmon was called upon by the U.S. Secretary of State, Richard Olney, to
determine the legal rights of the United States.4" His conclusion was that
"the rules, principles and precedents of international law impose no
liability or obligation on the United States" to allow the river to flow
unhindered into Mexico.4 6

Thus, it is understandable that Harmon's

opinion, declaring the United States' right of territorial sovereignty
entitled it to use the water resources within its territory without limitation,
became intertwined with absolute sovereignty.47
This theory of absolute sovereignty has, for the most part, been
Eckstein, supranote 14, at 73-75.
4'See Cohen, supra note 1, at 522. See also, Tadros, supranote 16, at 1101-02.
42 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried,
Not Praised,36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 965, 967 ("This opinion has become so synonymous
with the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty that it now stands as the doctrine's
cornerstone, if not its entire foundation"). For a general history of the origin of the
Harmon Doctrine, see id. at 968-97.
" The Rio Grande flows roughly 1,885 miles, 1,240 of which form the border between
the United States and Mexico. See id. at 968 (citing 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
40See

1023 (1987)).
44See
id. at 969.
4
1 See id. at 973.
46 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 283 (1895). See Cohen, supra note 1, at 522;
McCaffrey,
supra note 42, at 984; Clyde Haberman, Sanliurfa Journal: Dam is Watering Hopefor a
New Fertile Crescent,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at A4.
41 See McCaffrey, supra note 42, at 979.
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rejected as impractical, given its potential effect upon other nations. 8 One
possible explanation for the softening of sovereignty is that the "traditional
ability of national governments to control events within their territorial
boundaries is being challenged by major new transboundary forces such as
transnational corporations, economic globalization and trade, international
crime and the rise of global communications and other technologies. ' 9 In
any case, the general perception of river management has clearly shifted
from exploitation of the water to sustainable development."
Directly opposed to the absolute sovereignty ideology is the theory
of absolute territorial integrity. This theory advocates the belief that a
riparian state may not utilize an international river in a way that will harm
another riparian state." One can easily see why this is the favored theory
among lower riparians. Like absolute sovereignty, absolute integrity
52
"fail[s] to recognize reciprocal sovereign rights or shared interests.
Accordingly, this theory has also received a great deal of scholarly
criticism and has been rejected due to its inequitable distribution of
responsibility and benefits. 3
C. Compromise: Limited TerritorialSovereignty and Limited Integrity of
the River (Sic Utere)
Modem international waterway law centers around a compromise
between the absolute sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity55
theorems.- This compromise falls under the legal principle of sic utere.
Under this principle, a state is obligated not to use, or allow the use of, its
See id. at 1007 ("States do not, and cannot, exist in isolation"); Tadros, supra note 16,
at 1102.

48

William R. Moomaw, International Environmental Policy and the Softening of
Sovereignty, 21 FLETCHER F.WORLD AFF.7, 7 (1997).
41

5o See Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Susan Murcott, The Danube River Basin:
InternationalCooperationor SustainableDevelopment, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 521, 522
(1996) (referring specifically to the Danube River).
"' See Cohen, supra note 1, at 523.
512
Melanne Andromecca Civic, A New Conceptual Frameworkfor Jordan River Basin
Management: A Proposalfor a Trusteeship Commission, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 285, 295 (1998) (citing D. CAPONERA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATER
7 (1980)).
RESOURCES
53
See id. See generally, William L. Griffin, The Use of Waters of InternationalDrainage
Basins Under Customary InternationalLaw, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 70 (1959).
14 See Eckstein, supra note 14, at 75.
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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territory for acts contrary to the rights of other states.16
If interpreted literally, sic utere would seem to advocate the
absolute integrity approach. However, in practice, sic utere has not been
applied in such an inflexible manner. 7 Instead, the common law
recognizes sic utere as a broad principle that demands that the user must
balance the negative effects of his actions against the benefits obtained. 8
In other words, the substance of sic utere is a delicate conflict between the
"equitable utilization" and "no harm" rules.
"Equitable utilization" can be considered as a utilitarian costbenefit analysis--each riparian is entitled to a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of an international water resource. 9 Thus,
equitable utilization allows detrimental use of water resources so long as
the benefits of the activity outweigh the harm caused by the activity. The
"no harm" rule, on the other hand, is a per se rule that obligates
each state
not to cause harm to another.6'
The two principles generate conflict because under equitable
utilization, a use that causes significant harm may be permitted in certain
instances, whereas the no harm rule disallows any use that significantly
harms another.62 The role of international law is to clear up this conflict
and provide guidance for state planning regarding the use of international
waterways.63
Notwithstanding the great burden of integrating these two
principles, both the International Law Association (ILA)6 and the

56

See Eckstein, supra note 14, at 75.
See Utton, supra note 39, at 158.
58
See id.
59
See Eckstein, supranote 14, at 78-79.
' See id.
61 See Julio Barberis,
The Development of International Law of Transboundary
Groundwater
31
NAT.
RESOURCES
J. 167, 170, n.5 (1991).
62
See Wouters, supra note 15, at 420.
63 See generally Charlotte Elizabeth Glinka, Note, Global
Imperative-An Effective
System of Resolution Techniques for International Environmental Disputes: The
Canadian-U.S.Example, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rv. 127 (1990).
6 Established in 1873, the ILA is a non-governmental organization
of legal experts. See
Michelle R. Sergent, Comparison of the Helsinki Rules to the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles:
Will the Progression of International Watercourse Law Be Dammed?, 8 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 435, 447 (1997). In 1954, the ILA formed a committee to study the law regarding
transboundary water resources, which led to the adoption of the Helsinki Rules. See id.
57
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International Law Commission (ILC)65 have attempted to codify the sic
utere rule.
The ILA's Helsinki Rules6 require states to "take all appropriate
measures to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary impact."'67 The
term "transboundary impact" is defined broadly.68 The ILC's Draft
Article 69 attempt to integrate the "equitable utilization" and "no harm"
principles through two separate articles." Article 5 maintains that states
shall "utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner."7 ' Article 7 contains the "no harm" provision: "Watercourse
States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in
such a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States. 7273
Although these Articles seem to conflict, Article 7 appears to control,
rendering equitable utilization merely a factor to be considered in
65

The ILC was established in 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly to serve the
purpose of "encouraging the progressive development of international law and its
codification." Stephen McCaffrey, Is Codification in Decline?, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REv. 639, 640 (1997) (citing G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/519 (1948) and
quoting U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1).
66 See United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312 [hereinafter
Helsinki Rules].
67 Id. at

1315.

See id. at 1314-15. "Transboundary impact" is defined as:
[A]ny significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a
change in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by a human
activity, the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part
within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party, within an area under
the jurisdiction of another Party. Such effects on the environment
include effects on human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water,
climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical
structures or the interaction among these factors; they also include
effects on the cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting
from alterations to those factors.
Id.
69 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 49' Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994)
Draft Articles].
[hereinafter
70
See Wouters, supra ni-,te 15, at 421-23.
7' Draft Articles, supranote 69, art. 5(1).

68

72

Id. art. 7(1).

See Wouters, supra note 15, at 423. Violation of due diligence occurs if the State
knows or ought to know that the "particular use of an international watercourse would
cause significant harm to other watercourse States." Id.

71
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consultations where significant harm has occurred.74 Thus, under the Draft
Articles, a state may utilize a waterway only if it knows or ought to know
that such use will not cause significant harm to another state. 5 Other
multi-lateral agreements also recognize the principle of sic utere, including
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration76 and Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration."
This notion of sic utere has been recognized and upheld in many
international adjudication and arbitration cases, such as the Island of
Palmas case, 78 the Trail Smelter case, 79 and the Corfu Channel case. 0 In
Trail Smelter, the United States brought suit against Canada for damage to
U.S. crops resulting from air pollution from a Canadian smelting operation
in British Columbia."' By agreement of the parties, the case was submitted
to an arbitration tribunal, which found that:
[U]nder the principles of international law ... no
State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is

74

See id. at 423-24.
See id. at 423.
The Stockholm Declaration notes:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
'n United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
78 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 839 (1928).
79
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1938 and 1941).
80 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); see Martin D. Gelfand, Note,
PracticalApplication of International Environmental Law: Does it Work Atoll?, 29
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 73, 77 (1997).
8 See Farah Khakee, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Need
to Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 852 (19921993).
75
76
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established by clear and convincing evidence.82
This decision has been read as an acknowledgement of the
83
obligation between nations to protect transboundary resources.
Trail Smelter also demonstrates another facet of sic utere, the
85
requirement that the harm caused must be "significant ' 8 or "substantial,"
meaning that the "injury must have a significant and consequential effect
upon public health, economic productivity, or the environment of another
state. '8 6 The relevant language in Trail Smelter requires a case of "serious
consequence" and that "the injury [be] established by clear and convincing
evidence.""7
The Island of Palmas case also evinces the acceptance of the sic
utere principle in customary international law. This case arose out of a
dispute between the United States and the Netherlands regarding the
8
sovereign rights over the island of Palmas, off the Philippine coast.
The Corfu Channel case involved a dispute between Great Britain
89
and Albania over Albania's placement of mines in the Corfu Channel.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that customary international
law dictates that ships of all nations have the right to navigate "through
straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas
without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the
' 9 The italicized portion of the excerpt demonstrates
passage is innocent."
that the ICJ took the 'no harm' rule into account while balancing the
asserted interests of the parties.

82

Trail Smelter, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.

83 See Khakee, supra note 81, at 852.
84 Draft Articles, supra note 69, at 236.
85 Eckstein, supra note 14, at 77-78, n.33 (noting the comment to Article Ten of the
Helsinki Rules provides "an injury is considered 'substantial' if it materially interferes
with
86 or prevents a reasonable use of the water").

at 78.
Id.

87Trail Smelter, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
88See Benjamin K. Sibbett, Note, Tokdo or Takeshima?

The TerritorialDisputeBetween
Japan and the Republic of Korea, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606, 1625 (1998).
89 See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 4-12 (Apr. 9); Craig J.Capon, The Threat of Oil
Pollution in the Mallacca Strait: Arguing for a Broad Interpretation of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 117, 128 (1998).
9 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (Apr. 9) (emphasis added). See Capon, supra note
89, at 127.
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Lanoux9'

In the Lake
arbitration decision, the court upheld "the
sovereignty in its own territory of a State desirous of carrying out
hydroelectric developments" but acknowledged "the correlative duty not
to injure the interests of a neighboring state,"92 thus firmly establishing the
principle of sic utere in case law.93
I.

SOLVING INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY DISPUTES

This section describes the four modem resolution methods
available for international disputes, provides examples of modem usage of
these methods, and reveals the problems and criticisms associated with
these schemes.
A. Customary InternationalLaw
General or customary international law as illustrated above is an
essential part of solving international waterway disputes. However,
standing alone, custom is not binding on states." For international custom
to reach the level of law, it must satisfy the requirement of opinio juris,
which occurs when all nations agree to be bound legally to that custom.9s
Therefore, even though sic utere is a widely accepted theory, the
persistence of some countries in clinging to the principles of absolute
sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity, among other theories,
prevents this principle from becoming binding international law. 96
B. MultilateralTreaties and Negotiation
As noted above, many multilateral treaties have promoted the use
9'Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arbitral Trib. 1957) [hereinafter
Lake
Lanoux].
92
1d. at 111-12.

9'See Lazerwitz, supra note 16, at 251-52.

94 See David Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
Two Steps

Forwardand One Back, Or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 603, 649 (1995).
95 See Khakee, supra note 81, at 875. Implicit in the notion
of opinio juris are two
conditions: The collective actions amount to a settled practice and that they are
carried
out in a manner that evidences a belief that the practice is obligatory by existing
laws
requiring it. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
64 (1st ed. 1980).
96
See Khakee, supra note 81, at 875.
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of sic utere.97 However, unless all affected parties join the agreement, its
effect may be limited. For example, the ILA's status as an unofficial
organization undermines the enforceability of the Helsinki Rules. 98 The
ILA's status renders its resolutions legally unenforceable in international
law unless they are adopted in the form of multilateral convention or
become the domestic law in the particular state.19 The same is true for the
ILC's Draft Articles."° Unlike the Helsinki Rules, however, the attention
that the Draft Articles have received in the international community, "as
well as the fact that they were prepared by a respected United Nations
expert commission, will make it more difficult for states to ignore [the
rules] or challenge their existence."''
Generally, the Helsinki Rules and Draft Articles "provide no
binding enforcement mechanism but instead are designed to show mutual
awareness of environmental concerns and to express good faith efforts to
control and contain environmental damage between countries.' 0 ° States
are hesitant to enter into strict binding agreements, because, in doing so,
they surrender a very significant asset, discretion. 3 States are accustomed
to an enormous degree of discretion, and therefore tend to avoid the4 risk of
subverting their interests to the benefit of another state's interests. 0
Nonetheless, negotiations in the form of multilateral treaties or
bilateral agreements are central to promote stable cohabitation among
states sharing a specific resource. 05 It is important for the countries6
involved to reach an agreement that allows them to coexist peacefully.1
Because of the need to coexist, an all-or-nothing ruling, even if the most
97 See Developments in the Law-InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1484, 1496-98 (1991).
98 See Lazerwitz, supra note 16, at 253.

99 See id.
"oSee Devereaux F. McClatchey, Note, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The
Evolution of State Responsibilityfor InternationalDisasters, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
659, 666, 678 (1996); Astrid Boos-Hersberger, TransboundaryWater Pollution and State
Responsibility: The Sandoz Spill, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 103, 124-25 (1997).
'o' Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Coming Fresh Water Crisis: InternationalLegal and
InstitutionalResponses, 21 VT. L. REv. 803, 818 (1997). See also HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 95, at 72 ("The drafts of the International Law Commission carry weight because of
the high reputation of that body and of the jurists that make it up.").
102 Glinka, supra note 63, at 130-31.
'03 See id. at 131-32.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 135-36.
'o

See id.
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equitable solution, may not be the best solution for the countries
involved. °7 After all, an unsatisfied participant may turn to war before
accepting an unfavorable decision.°8 In addition, negotiations open
channels for communication between the states involved.'10
Multilateral agreements promote solutions to international disputes
by establishing flexible guidelines that permit states to reach an agreement
themselves instead of facing the risks involved with unpredictable
litigation."10
C. InternationalInstitutions
Another method of international dispute resolution to be discussed
is the formation of international institutions. International institutions are
comprised of representatives of the states involved in the dispute."' These
institutions are often made up of a team of scientists and low-level
politicians of the affected states." 2 The interaction between the individuals
of the separate states, standing alone, is a possible benefit." 3 This
interaction may "depoliticize cooperation and break down political barriers
to it.",4
The problem of state reluctance to concede its sovereign powers is
not an issue for international institutions. The true effectiveness of
international institutions lies in the establishment of communication,
mutual monitoring, and interaction between the states."5
These
institutions can also provide a benefit by disseminating information to the
public." 6 This process allows public pressure to become a key factor in
domestic decision making." 7 While the addition of more public
involvement may seem to be a desirable end, in practice it may be an
impediment to governmental endorsement of international institutions.
This presents problems similar to those surrounding strict enforcement
See id.
'o'
See Glinka, supra note 63, at 135, 136 n.48.
,' See id. at 136; Benvenisti, supranote 5, at 400-01.
"0 See Benvenisti, supranote 5, at 402.
17

".. See

id. at 411.

" 2 See
113See

id. at 412.
id.

114Id.

115
See id.

See id.
117
See id.
116
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mechanisms: the government would be sacrificing one of its critical
powers, the power to decide what information the public needs and does
not need to know.
D. Third Party Settlement
The Trail Smelter and Lake Lanoux Arbitration cases 18 are
examples of the contribution third party settlements have advanced. This
note discusses three main forms of third party international dispute
resolution techniques: (1) mediation; (2) arbitration; and (3) adjudication.
1. Mediation
Mediation is similar to negotiation, but includes an "independent
and objective third party who guides the parties toward agreement.""' 9 The
purpose of mediation is to bring the parties to a consensus on crucial and
significant issues.2 0 Because the mediator is independent and objective,
communications can be more open.' 21 However, communications may
break down because states will be reluctant to reveal all relevant
information unless the state is certain the information cannot be used
against it in later proceedings.'2 Another drawback of mediation is that it
is not binding." The parties cannot be forced to agree on a specific
2
issue.
2. Arbitration
Arbitration may facilitate a dispute resolution if negotiation or
mediation fail to bring about an agreement. 25 Arbitration is very similar to
mediation in that a third party is introduced to facilitate agreement
between the parties. 126 However, an arbiter's decision is binding upon the
US
"1

I20

See supranotes 79-87, 91-93 and accompanying text.
Glinka, supra note 63, at 138.

See id. at 138-39.
id. at 139.

121See

See Michael F. Hoellering, World Trade to Arbitrate or Mediate-That is the
Mar. 1994, at 67, 68.
Question, DISP. RESOL. J.,
122
123
124

See id.
See id.

125 See Glinka, supra note 63, at 140.
h
126 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6" ed. 1990).
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parties.'
The arbiter is normally a member of an official institution that
offers its services to businesses (and countries).'28 These institutions can
be categorized into different groups: public and private; national and
international; and general and specialized institutions.'29 The success of
these arbitration institutions has varied. 30
Arbitration has a key advantage in that if it is used often, the
resulting decisions establish a source of legal principles and precedents.'
Other advantages include: enforceability of arbitral awards,3 2 impartiality
of decision maker,' confidentiality,' technical expertise,'35 discovery, 36
expense,'37 familiarity,'
predictability,'39 and party participation. 40
However, arbitration does have two notable disadvantages.
One
'

27

128
'

29

See id.
See RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 38 (1985).

See id. at 40-48.

130 See id.
"' See Glinka, supra note 63, at 143; Jean Heiliman Grier, Providingfor Arbitration in
International Business Transactions, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, at 9, 11 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 863, 1994).
'32 See Grier, supra note 131, at 11 ("Arbitration awards
can be challenged under very
limited circumstances."); James H. Carter, Dispute Resolution and International
Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, at 405, 409 (PLI
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 703, 1994) ("The resulting
award will be subject to relatively little risk of being set aside or altered by a court.").
'33

See Grier, supra note 131, at 11.

See id. ("Arbitrations and awards are normally private; court proceedings and
judgments are public.").
"s See id. ("Parties may choose arbitrators with technical backgrounds."); cf Carter,
supra note 132, at 409 ("[A]t least in theory, the arbitrators will have applicable
specialized commercial and legal expertise.").
136 See Grier, supra note 131, at 11 ("Because discovery is limited in an arbitration,
it is
less burdensome.").
1' See id. ("Arbitration is usually less expensive than litigation"); cf Carter, supra note
132, at 410 ("There are usually no costly depositions in arbitration, reducing costs
somewhat, but since arbitrators must be paid, the cost may be ultimately as high as
litigation (or even higher).").
138 See Grier, supra note 131, at 12 ("Parties are often unfamiliar
with foreign legal
systems.").
3 See Carter, supra note 132, at 409 ("The dispute will be resolved in one place and not
by a race to judgement in the courts of two nations.").
40 See id. ("The procedures often are shaped by the parties as well as the arbitrators,
rather than dictated by detailed rules as in litigation."). See also Hoellering, supra note
122, at 67.
'34
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disadvantage is that the process may be slow because the parties must
agree on the specific focus of the debate and on the arbitrators
themselves.'' The second problem has been mentioned above: states are
reluctant to surrender their sovereign powers to have a third party settle a
dispute.' 2
3. Adjudication
The third major form of third party dispute settlement is
adjudication. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was designed to
adjudicate international disputes.' 4 The ICJ is the principle judicial organ
of the United Nations.'" The court has jurisdiction in two possible
cases. 45 The first type of case that the Court has jurisdiction over is
"incidental matters. 116 This jurisdiction is derived by statute-once a
country becomes a member of the United Nations or a party to the statute,
that state agrees to the exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with the
47
statute.
The second type of jurisdiction that the ICJ possesses is quite
different and generates much criticism of both the Court's importance and
its ability to settle disputes. This jurisdiction is called "mainline
49 in that the
jurisdiction,"' 4 and it differs from "incidental jurisdiction'
50 In other
parties involved must give their consent to ICJ jurisdiction.
words, the parties must agree to be bound by the Court's decision. The
fact that the parties must agree to a binding decision raises the same
concerns addressed above: states do not want to sacrifice their sovereignty
to the "win-lose" nature of third party resolution or, in this case, the

14 See
4

'1

Glinka, supra note 63, at 142-43; Carter, supra note 132, at 411.
See supra notes 71-72, 87 and accompanying text.

"' See Glinka, supra note 63, at 146.
'44
See Alison Raina Ferrante, The Dolphin/Tuna Controversyand EnvironmentalIssues:
Will the World Trade Organization's"Arbitration Court" and the InternationalCourt of
Justice's Chamberfor Environmental Matters Assist the United States and the World in
Environmental Goals? 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 279, 306-07 (1996).
Furthering
45
' See id. at 308.
146 See id.
147See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 21
(1995).
148 Ferrante, supra note 144, at 308.
149Id.

50See

id. at 309.
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adjudicative process.,
"Litigation is not designed to produce a mutually acceptable
solution to the parties involved." '52 Hence, most states prefer diplomatic
negotiation to the risk of losing everything in one decision.," There are,
however, several advantages to bringing a dispute before the ICJ:
Disputes can be removed from the political arena
where negotiations often become bogged down. A decision
by the ICJ also promises finality to the disputed issue and
deflects some of the criticism from governments for
unpopular or unfavorable solutions. Further, it establishes
legal standards and precedents that become part of a body
of international environmental law.'54
The first and third points of this excerpt are greatly, if not
completely, correct. The first point is certainly true. The ICJ may be an
excellent alternative to negotiation when the parties cannot settle their
differences. The third point concerning the establishment of precedent,
although not strictly accurate, may be deemed accurate through practice. 5 '
The Court is not bound by precedent, due to Article 59 of the Statute of
the ICJ.'5 6 However, the Court is "likely to draw on its previous
jurisprudence."',57
On the other hand, the assertion that "[a] decision by the ICJ also
promises finality to the disputed issue and deflects some of the criticism
from governments for unpopular or unfavorable solutions, ' '5 can be
attacked on both counts. Seemingly, the "deflection of criticism" aspect of
the excerpt is not accurate, as the government could still be criticized for
,5ISee Glinka, supra note 63, at 147. See also Ferrante, supra note 144,
at 311
("[N]ations have been unwilling to limit their sovereignty to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court. Nations are unwilling to consume time and resources adjudicating
matters
that are of secondary importance. Nor are they willing to risk adjudicating
matters of
primary importance in a non-domestic court.").
152 Ferrante, supra note
144, at 311.
153 See
id.
"sGlinka, supra note 63, at 147-48.
'55 See Gerry J.Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination
at the
InternationalCourt ofJustice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 323, 332 (1994).
'56 See 59 Stat. 1031, 1062; Simpson, supra note 155,
at 332.
...
Simpson, supra note 155, at 333.
,'Glinka, supra note 63, at 148.

1998]

UNDER THE DANUBE CANOPY

entering into an unfavorable binding third party dispute decision.'59 The
°
"finality of the disputed issue" may be questioned as well.16 An implied
6
obligation that the ICJ's decisions will be followed in good faith exists.' '
Further, if a nation fails to comply with the decision of the Court, the
matter may be referred to the UN Security Council, which will decide how
to handle the matter. 62
However, this type of enforcement of ICJ decisions is not
foolproof, as demonstrated in a case between Nicaragua and the United
States, in which "[tihe United States refused to acknowledge the
jurisdiction of the Court or to accept the decisions in the case. When the
matter was referred to the Security Council, a negative vote by the United63
States prevented the adoption of any resolution by the Security Council.'
Thus, although the ICJ's decisions are "binding" and "final," enforcement
1
problems exist, and states may be able to avoid compliance. 6' This
occurrence also demonstrates another problem of enforcement. Many
observers of the Court believe that the credibility of the Court is65
"threatened by the possibility of nonenforcement or judicial partiality."'
Thus, developing countries, for example, would seem less likely to enter
into the Court's jurisdiction for fear that the Court may be in some way
partial to the developed country, and vice versa. Hence, in practice,
"political factors have often determined what matters are deemed
justiciable by the Court .... [and] some issues are simply too political for
'
resolution at the I.C.J.5'
Certain limitations on the ICJ have led some to comment that "the
ICJ is not well suited to resolve environmental and natural resource
disputes."'67 Appearances before the International Court of Justice are
limited to nations, even though the groups that are the most willing and
best equipped to do so may be various other agencies or international
Ferrante, supra note 144, at 311.
id.
See
'60
id. at 310.
See
16!
162 See id.
159

63

1

See

id.

'64 See id.
165

Simpson, supra note 155, at 330.

See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE

WORLD COURT (1986).

Simpson, supra note 155, at 330.
Paul R. Williams, Can International Legal Principles Play a Positive Role in
Resolving Central and East European TransboundaryEnvironmental Disputes?, 7 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 457 (1995) [hereinafter Williams, International Legal
Principles].
'6
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forums.'68

Also among the problems facing the ICJ are the complex issues
concerning indispensable third parties. 69' Generally, the ICJ, like most
judicial bodies, is hesitant to decide the merits of a case that will
compromise the rights and obligations of a state whose interests are not
represented in the proceedings. 70
In addition, the time consuming decision making process involved
is especially dangerous in an environmental case, as the resource in
question may be ruined in the years that it takes for the Court to reach a
7
decision.1 '
Other alleged problems facing the Court in environmental
litigation include the Court's lack of the necessary expertise to
significantly resolve the issues,"' and its poor fact-finding capabilities. 7
The Court does have a legitimate concern in "opening the floodgates to
participation by every individual and association interested in its
proceedings."' 74 However, environmental cases in particular involve many
interests affected by the Court's decisions that are not represented by the
states included in the action. 7 5 Hence, some argue that the ICJ must be
more receptive to
receiving
information available
through
nongovernmental organizations and public interest groups in order to
possess the full information and to "preserve the rational evolution of the
76
law.'
To illustrate the benefits and drawbacks involved in environmental
litigation in the ICJ, the next section examines the Court's first major
environmental dispute resolution,' 77 a case involving a contract between
Hungary and Slovakia concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project.

Khakee, supra note 81, at 888; Tadros, supranote 16, at 1129.
Simpson, supranote 155, at 344.
70
1 See id.
'7' See Ferrante, supra note
144, at 312.
172 See Tadros, supra note 16, at 1129.
171 See Ferrante, supranote 144, at 312.
'7' Dinah Shelton, The Participationof Nongovernmental
Organizations in International
JudicialProceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 624 (1994).
171 See id. at 626.
68ee
69ee

176 id.

177 See Andrew Kelly, U.N. Court Decides Its First Major Case on
the Environment,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13063359.
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III. ICJ DETERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE CONCERNING THE GABCIKOVONAGYMAROS PROJECT

A. Background on the Danube River and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project
The Danube River, like all rivers, provides a valuable resource for
many competing uses. It is the major source of drinking water in all its
bordering countries except Bulgaria. 79 It is also used for irrigation,
fishing, tourism, and industry. 8 Its importance in industry is growing as
East-West European trade booms. 8 ' In addition to these uses, the Danube
is in many ways, a unique aquatic ecosystem.'82
In the 1950s, Czechoslovakia and Hungary began developing a
large-scale hydropower project to demonstrate the fruits of socialist
cooperation.'83 The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project ("G-N Project" or
"project"), as it was called, was "basically a plan to divert the Danube
River from its natural watercourse into a navigable artificial waterway
located within the borders of Czechoslovakia.""' Three dams were to be
built. One would be "located at the mouth of the canal, to divert the
Danube into the canal"; the second "in the mid region of the canal, to
regulate water level and generate hydroelectric power"; and the third
"downstream of the canal, to return the water levels to run-of-the-river and
to generate additional hydroelectric power."'85
Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed an agreement in 1977 to go
forward with the project. 8 6 However, political change in Hungary doomed
the project, as Hungarian environmental groups, concerned about the
See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 50, at 524.
See id.
180 See id.
181See id.
See id. at 524-25.
183 See id. at 526-27.
184 Paul R. Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute
Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabcikovo and
Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1994) [hereinafter Williams,
InternationalEnvironmentalDispute Resolution].
17'

179

185 Id.

See Treaty Between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977, Hung.-Czech. Rep., 1109 U.N.T.S. 236. See also
Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 50, at 527.
186
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project's effects, generated democratic opposition. 87' Hungary stopped
work on its own dam in 1989 and the country's first freely elected
Parliament repudiated the project altogether in 1992."8' Political change
was ensuing on the other side of the border as well, as Czechoslovakia
divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 89
The Slovakian government refused to accept Hungary's
repudiation and went on with the project, diverting the river to feed
the
Gabcikovo dam reservoir."9 As a result of this action, "over a 30
mile
stretch of the Danube River, which formed the border between Slovakia
and Hungary, is now located in Slovakia."' 9 ' The effects of the diversion
on the river are severe:
The Danube, which once coursed through a forest,
now flows in a concrete canal. The section of the river that
once marked the frontier has shriveled into a pathetic creek;
water flow, the Hungarians claim, has been reduced by
more than 90 percent, the fish harvest in the region has
declined by 60 percent and the quality of the downstream
water supply available to Hungary's farmland has been
degraded by increasing concentrations of toxins in a
decreasing amount of water. 92
The Hungarians claimed that Slovakia disregarded their territorial
sovereignty, that their constituents' rights were jeopardized, and that
the
environmental damage caused by the diversion could not be tolerated.', 3
The Slovaks, on the other hand, argued that the environmental damages
could be mitigated by the completion of the G-N Project and
other
engineering methods, 9 " and that the project was vital to Slovakia's
security and self-sufficiency.195 In addition, the costs would be outweighed
by the gains in energy production, flood control and enhanced navigability
187
See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 50, at 527.
.8 See Mark Schapiro, Unquiet Flows the Danube (Hungary Sues
Slovakia Over
HydroelectricProject), THE NATION, Mar. 10, 1997, availablein 1997
WL 8866249.
189 See id.
'90 See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 50, at 527.
191Id.

'92Schapiro, supra note 188.
See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 50, at 527.
94
1 See
id.
9 See Schapiro, supra note 188.
' 93
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of the river."'
Tensions were at their highest as Hungary and Slovakia began a
"nerve-racking set of military maneuvers along the border in the fall of
1992."' 1 The European Union intervened and demanded that Hungary and
Slovakia consent to ICJ jurisdiction over this matter. 98 Both States agreed
99
to allow the Court to settle the matter due to pressure by the Union.'
Without the persuasion of the Union, it is quite doubtful that Hungary and
Slovakia would have agreed to consent to ICJ jurisdiction.2 "
The near-armed conflict over this matter demonstrates the length to
which Hungary and Slovakia would go to defend their sovereignty. Thus,
this case reinforces the point raised above that a state's fear of diminished
sovereignty will deter it from consenting to the binding jurisdiction of the
ICJ.20 1

B. The ICJand the Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject
When the dispute between Slovakia and Hungary came before the
ICJ, the Slovaks maintained the stance that Hungary had breached the
1977 agreement and that Slovakia was justified in going through with its
provisional solution, diverting the river.20 2 Hungary's legal argument
focused on the legality of Slovakia's provisional solution, not on the
question of breach of contract.0 3 Specifically, Hungary argued that
Slovakia breached several treaties. 2°' Furthermore, Hungary contended
that Slovakia violated Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity under
customary international law. 25
See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supranote 50, at 527.
197 Schapiro, supranote 188.
196

198
See id.

'99 See id. (explaining that unwillingness to consent would render the state ineligible to
Community and NATO).
join
200 the European
See id.
201 See supra notes 71-72, 87, 107 and accompanying text.
20
See Williams, InternationalEnvironmentalDispute Resolution, supra note 184, at 20.
203

See id.

See id. at 21 (relating Hungary's contention that Slovakia "violate[d] the 1947 Paris
Peace Treaty, the Danube River Convention, and a number of bilateral treaties between
the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary"); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), No. 92 (Sept. 25, 1997) (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocketihs/ihsjudgement/his_ijudment_ 970925_frame.htm>.
205 See Williams, InternationalEnvironmentalDispute Resolution, supra note 184, at 2021.
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On September 25, 1997, the ICJ delivered its ruling.2°6 The Court
found that "Hungary had not been entitled to suspend and subsequently
abandon in 1989 its part of the works in the dam project laid down in the
treaty."207 However, the Court also found that although "Czechoslovakia
had been entitled to proceed in November 1991 to [prepare its plan to
divert the river] as an alternative provisional solution," it was not "entitled
to put [the provisional solution] into operation from October 1992."208
Furthermore, the ICJ also decided that unless the parties agreed otherwise,
Hungary was required to compensate Slovakia for the damages sustained
by Czechoslovakia and Slovakia due to the suspension and abandonment
of the project; and Slovakia was required to.compensate Hungary for
damages sustained due to Slovakia's "provisional solution."2 9
The Court ordered Hungary and Slovakia to negotiate in good faith
and take all measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the
treaty."' New norms and standards, developed over the two decades after
the agreement, must be taken into account. 2" Thus, the States must look
afresh at the effects on the environment and devise a solution that will be
amicable to Hungary, Slovakia, as well as the environment.12
The Court's ruling essentially places the duty back on Hungary and
Slovakia to negotiate a settlement, a process that has failed once before. 23
These negotiations differ quite a bit from the previous attempt, for the
Court's ruling cleared up many issues of disagreement between the parties
and made certain legal determinations binding.2 4
However, this does not mean that Hungary and Slovakia will easily
reach an agreement. In fact, indications are that the parties remain "far
apart" after three rounds of talks.1 5 In any case, a settlement to this
26 See

Kelly, supra note 177.

207 Modern Environmental Law Applicable to 1977 Treaty, TIMES (London),
Oct. 31,

1997, at 37, available in 1997 WL 9239616. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung.
v. Slovk.), supra note 204.
208 Modern EnvironmentalLaw Applicable to 1977 Treaty, supra
note 207.
20
9See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), supra note
204.
21
0Modern EnvironmentalLaw Applicable to 1977 Treaty, supra
note 207.
211 See id.
212
See id.
211 See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 50,
at 527; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), supranote 204.
214
See Modern EnvironmentalLaw Applicable
to 1977 Treaty, supra note 207.
215 See Another Round of Talks on Gabcikovo Fails, CZECH
NEWs AGENCY, Mar. 10,
1999, available in 1999 WL 5472945 (relating that Slovakia and Hungary
have
completely different interpretations of the Court's ruling).
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dispute does not appear to be in the near future." ' This fact exemplifies
the criticism of the time consuming nature of the Court: a significant
chance exists that substantial damage will occur before the dispute is
resolved.17
Although the problems alluded to above persist, many encouraging
signs have emerged from this case. The Court demonstrated its
resourcefulness, namely by sifting through court filings exceeding 500
volumes218 and executing its first "site visit" ever.219 The Court gave
weight to the ILC's development of international waterway law by
recognizing some of the Commission's draft articles on state
220
responsibility.
The Court potentially made itself a more attractive solution for
disputing states by accepting the Court's special role in Hungary and
Slovakia's agreement. 22' The Court continued its development of its role
as a "partner in preventive diplomacy" as well as its more well-known role
of a judicial "last resort." 2 In other words, the Court resolved the legal
aspects of the dispute, yet allowed Hungary and Slovakia the space to
negotiate and therefore retain some of the sovereignty states so dearly
crave. 221
IV. CONCLUSION

One of the many important lessons to take from the GabcikovoNagymaros case is that the role of negotiation is still the principal system
used to solve international disputes. States rigorously assert their
sovereignty. While forums for third party resolution such as arbitration
and adjudication are developing and growing in popularity, states remain
reluctant to use these tools because they involve the sacrifice of a great
deal of state autonomy.
216 See

id.

See Williams, InternationalLegal Principles,supra note 167, at 457.
218See UN: Budget, Staff Cuts Put Strain on Int'l Court of Justice, Court President Tells
General Assembly, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15141216
(explaining that sifting through the volumes "placed a considerable burden on the Court's
translation services").
tiny
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See id.
217

220 See

221

id.

See id.

222 1d.

"2See id.
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International laws, such as those regarding waterways, reinforce
the predominance of negotiation because they are "soft," or in other
words, they are general in such a way that encourages settlement between
the parties involved. Strict, or "hard," law would frustrate negotiation as
the law would be clearly defined.
In the international setting, a mutually beneficial decision between
two sovereign states is much more desirable than hard rules that leave one
state sulking. The goal is to foster peace between nations as well as
solving the dispute itself. States that are unhappy with the outcome of
hard rules may more be tempted to resist compliance, and the strife would
continue.
Negotiations will break down at times. They are far from the
"answer." However, the International Court of Justice demonstrated its
flexibility in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case by acting essentially as a tool
of negotiation. The Court in reality solved pressing legal disagreements,
but left the "decision" itself to be worked out by Slovakia and Hungary. It
remains to be seen whether this case will be settled amicably and in time
to avoid permanent damage to the fragile ecosystem and the overall
environment of the Danube region.
Until states relax their claims to sovereignty in order to attain some
specific international goal, such as universal rules governing international
waterways, negotiation will dominate international dispute resolutions.
The ICJ, recognizing a chance to make a difference, did what it could to
promote this process.

